Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Number of Credits: 7 credits

Hours: 30 hours of Lectures, 30 hours of Tutorials including exam, and 20 hours of flipped Classrooms with tutor support.

General Presentation: This course is the second one in a sequence of three courses that aim to cover Microeconomics at the Graduate level. Each course can be taken independently. Even if no prerequisite is asked in microeconomics, a course of Intermediate Economics may help.

Microeconomics 2A: Game Theory.

Basic elements of noncooperative games: what is a game, extensive form representation of a game, strategies and the normal form representation of a game, randomized choice. Simultaneous-move games: dominant and domminated strategies, rationalizable strategies, Nash equilibrium, games of incomplete information, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the possibility of mistakes, trembling hand perfection. Dynamic games: sequential rationality, backward induction, subgame perfection, beliefs and sequential rationality, reasonable beliefs and forward induction.

Microeconomics 2B: Economics of Information.

The Principal-Agent problem: introduction and examples. The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off with Hidden information (Adverse Selection): basic theory, examples, extensions. Hidden action (moral hazard): basic trade-offs, examples, extensions. Hidden action and hidden information: hybrid models. Non verifiability.

Books: Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., Green, J., Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. Chapters 7-9 and Chapters 13-14 and 23.

Prerequisites: Logic and Sets, Multivariable Calculus, and Optimization.